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CARTER Cert to Ky. Supreme 
Court 
v. (Per Curiam) 
KENTUCKY State/Criminal Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Petr argues that it was a violation of his Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination for the state 
court to refuse to instruct the jury that his failure to take the stand 
cannot prejudice him or be used against him as an inference of guilt . 
• 1/f 2. FACTS: Pe~r was convicted after jury trial of third-degree 
burglary, for which he received two years, and of being a first-degree 




following instruction: "The defendant is not compelled to testify and 
the fact that he does not cannot be used as an inference of guilt and 
should not prejudice him in any way." In his closing argument, defense 
counsel argued to the jury: "Why didn't Mr. Carter take the stand and 
testify? Let me tell you why ••• he doesn't have to take the stand in 
his own behalf. He doesn't have to do anything." The prosecution, in 
its closing argument, referred to the evidence against petr as "not 
controverted" and also urged the jury to "consider only what you have 
heard up here as evidence in this case and not something that you might 
speculate happened or could have happened •••. " 
3. DECISION BELOW: The Ky. S. Ct. affirmed petr's convictions, 
citing Green v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1972), wherein the 
court had held that a trial court did not err in refusing to give an 
instruction similar to that offered by petr. The ccurt also referred to 
KRS 421.225, which provides: "Testimony of Defendant. -- In any criminal 
or penal prosecution a defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to 
testify in his own behalf, but his failure to do so shall not be 
commented upon or create any presumption against him" (emphasis 
supplied). As for any comments made by the prosecutor, the court noted 
that defense counsel's opening comments "were an invitation to the 
Commonwealth's attorney to attack, which he did." The court also noted 
that defense counsel had made no objection to any of the prosecution's 
closing argument. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Petr argues that the trial court's refusal to give 
his offered instruction violated his Fifth Amendment rights. He relies 
primarily on the rationale of three Supreme Ct. opinions. Recognizing 
(~ . that Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 (1939), only considered the 
interpretation of a federal statute, petr nonetheless argues that the 
c 
- 3 -
logic of Bruno, recognizing the psychological operation of the jury's 
mind in considering a criminal defendant's failure to testify, supports 
his position here. While the instant question was specifically left open 
in~ iffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 n.6 (1965}, petr quotes the 
dissenting opinion in that case for the proposition that "whenever in a 
jury trial a defendant exercises this constitutional right, the members 
of the jury are bound to draw inferences from his silence ... Without 
J limiting instructions the da?ger exists that the inferences drawn by the 
j jury may be unfairly broad," id. at 623 '{stewart, J., dissenting}. 
Finally, petr relies on the recent opinion in Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 
u.s. 333 (1978), where this Court rejected the argument that the 
protective instruction · requested here constituted comment within the 
meaning of Griffin. Petr concludes his argument by ponting out that the 
Kentucky rule is contrary to the rule in at least thirty-two states. 
Resp stresses that Bruno involved the "narrow question" whether a 
specific federal statute required federal courts to give a "no inference" 
instruction, and that Griffin involved the entirely different question of 
adverse comment. In Lakeside the Court touched upon the gravamen of the 
instant dispute when it noted that "[i]t may be wise for a trial judge 
not to give such a cautionary instruction over a defendant's objection. 
And each state is, of course, free to forbid its trial judges from doing 
so as a matter of state law." 435 u.s. at 340. 
5. DISCUSSION: None of the decisions relied upon by petr support 
requiring the states, as a matter of constitutional law, to give a "no 
inference" instruction. In Bruno, 308 u.s. at 294, Griffin, 380 u.s. at 
621-23 (Stewart, J., dissenting}, and Lakeside, 435 u.s. at 339-40, id. 
' at 347 (Stevens, J., dissenting}, there was dispute over whether an 





to remain silent. In Bruno the matter was resolved by reference to 
Congress' decision; analogously the instant question should be left to 
the states. Under Lakeside the state can give a "no inference" 
instruction even if the accused believes he is better off without one. 
Symmetry would seem to counsel leaving it up to the state not to give 
such an instruction, again even if the accused believes he would be 
better off with one. 
There is a response. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul Cane 
DATE: January 12, 1981 
RE: No. 80-5060, Carter v. Kentucky 
Question Presented 
The question in this case is the one reserved in 
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 n.6 (1965): 
whether a state trial judge constitutionally must, upon 
the defendant 1 s request, instruct the jury not to place 





This case is another in a series involving the 
problems that arise when a defendant does not testify in 
his own behalf. It has long been established that the 
prosecution cannot force the defendant to testify. 
Indeed, the Fifth Amendment specifically so provides.l 
Nevertheless, for many years it was not clear what action 
the prosecution could take when a defendant exercised that 
constitutional right.2 In Griffin v. California, supra, 
the Court held that neither the prosecution nor the court 
may comment on the fact that the accused did not testify. 
The Court noted that 
not everyone . can safely venture on 
the witness stand though entirely innocent 
of the charge against him. Excessive 
timidity, nervousness when facing others 
and attempting to explain transactions of a 
suspicious character, and offenses charged 
against him, will often confuse and 
embarrass him to such a degree as to 
increase rather than remove prejudices 
against him. It is not every one, however 
lThe Fifth Amendment provides that "(n] o person 
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself • . 
2In federal cases, a statute makes clear that the trial 
judge is obliged to give the instruction requested in this 
case. See Bruno v. United States, 308 u.s. 287 (1939). 
honest, who would, therefore, willingly be 
placed on the witness stand. 
380 U.S. at 613, quoting Wilson v. United States, 149 u.s. 60. 
However, that the State cannot compel a defendant to 
testify does not necessarily mean that it cannot comment when a 
defendant refuses to do so. Indeed, the very fact that a 
defendant refused to testify demonstrates that he resisted any 
compulsion. The Griffin Court did not see this distinction as 
significant. According to the Court, for the prosecution or 
judge to comment on the absence of testimony is to penalize the 
defendant "for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts 
down on the privilege by making its assertion costly." Id. at 
614. 
After Griffin, cases in this Court and elsewhere 
focused on the nature of impermissible comment. One such case 
was Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978). In Lakeside, the 
trial judge had given a "no inference" instruction over the 
defendant's objection. The defendant contended that the 
instruction itself was impermissible comment because it 
"encourage [d] the jury to draw adverse inferences from" his 
silence. Id. The Court rejected this argument. The 
defendant's claim rested on two "very doubtful assumptions." 
Id. at 340. The first was the the jurors did not notice the 
4. 
defendant's failure to testify. The second was that the jury 
would disregard the judge's instruction. 
neither was likely. Accordingly, the 
conviction. 
The Court deemed that 
Court affirmed the 
This case presents essentially the converse of the 
issue in Lakeside. Here, the defendant wanted the "no 
inference" instruction, but the judge refused to give it. 
Discussion 
A. Petr's Arguments 
The Fifth Amendment establishes that 
defendant has the right to decline to testify. 
corollary of that right is that a defendant 
a criminal 
A necessary 
may not be 
penalized when he invokes it. Griffin v. California, supra, at 
614. Thus, it is common learning that neither the judge nor 
the prosecution may comment adversely when the defendant elects 
not to testify. 
This case does not present a problem of adverse 
comment. The problem here is that jurors, noting that a 
defendant has not testified, will assume that the defendant had 
no truthful exculpatory story to tell. According to petr, 
therefore, "if the right against compulsory self-incrimination 
is to be more than a mirage," the trial court must instruct the 
jurors not to place any weight on the nefendant 's failure to 
testify. 
Petr argues that his position is compelled by the 
Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth, and also by the due process clause. It is a grave 
threat both to a defendant's privilege not to testify, and also 
to the fact-finding process itself, if jurors are permitted to 
give evidentiary weight to their unfulfilled desire to hear 
testimony from the defendant. Trial judges must instruct 
jurors to disregard their natural instincts. 
Petr contends that whenever the defendant asks for 
such an instruction a per se constitutional rule requires the 
judge to give it. In the alternative, petr contends that such 
an instruction was constitutionally required on the facts of 
this case. With respect to the latter argument, petr points 
out several factors in the case which, he says, emphasized to 
the jury that he had not testified. First, a continuing theme 
throughout the trial was that petr had refused to explain his 
conduct. Police witnesses testified that he had refused to 
sign a Miranda waiver form or to speak to them.3 Second, 
• y 
3There appears to have been a 
case of the incipient majority 
plain violation in this 
position in Edwards v • 
6. 
petr 1 s lawyer in his opening statement essentially told the 
jury that petr, when he testified, would explain incriminating 
circumstantial evidence. The jury surely was surprised when 
petr did not do so. Third, petr declined to testify for 
reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence. The trial judge ruled 
that, if petr testified, he could be impeached with two prior 
felony convictions. It probably was a wise strategic decision 
not to testify in light of that prospect. 
These circumstances suggest that it was particularly 
important in this case to instruct the jury not to place any 
weight on petr 1 s failure to testify. Otherwise, the natural 
instincts of the jurors would lead them to attach an 
unwarranted negative inference to petr 1 s invocation of a 
constitutional privilege. 
B. Resp 1 s Arguments 
The Fifth Amendment primarily was directed at coerced 
testimony of the kind obtained in the notorious Star Chamber. 
.. . 
Arizona. But that issue was not preserved for review 
because petr failed to object to the introduction of 
testimony at trial. Although petr cannot prevail on this 
theory, and indeed did not present this issue in his 
petition for certiorari, the circumstances nevertheless 
may be highly relevant to the need for a "no inference" 
jury instruction. 
The lurid practices that prompted the adoption of the Fifth 
Amendment are not at issue in this case. This case has nothing 
to do with coerced testimony, nor even with a statement by the 
prosecutor or judge pointing out that the defendant elected not 
to testify. Rather, petr seems to insist that a court has an 
affirmative duty in effect to "tell the jury to ignore the fact 
that something did not happen." 
Kentucky's policy is not to give the instruction petr 
seeks. 4 Such an instruction is not in the best interests of 
the accused. Any comment, even a "no inference" instruction, 
calls to the attention of jurors the fact that the defendant 
did not testify. Kentucky, in prohibiting the "no inference" 
instruction, helps save the defendant from his own folly. 
States should be free to formulate their own rules in this 
respect. 
In any event, the evidence of guilt in this case was 
4KRS 421.225 provides that, "[i)n any criminal or penal 
prosecution the defendant, on his own request, shall be 
allowed to testify in his own behalf, but his failure to 
do so shall not be commented upon or create any 
presumption against him." The current position of the 
Kentucky courts is that this statute prohibits a "no 
inference" instruction even when the defendant requests 
it. 




police. He made incriminating 
The trial judge did instruct the 
had the burden of proving its 
statements to 
jury that the 
case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Thus, any error that might have been 
committed was harmless. 
C. Criticism & Analysis 
I tend to think that petr has the better of the 
arguments. Kentucky's rationale for not giving the "no 
inference" instruct ion is f 1 imsy. The State advances as its 
sole interest a purpose to provide more fairness in trials by 
not permitting its trial judges to comment, in the form of a 
"no inference" instruction, on a defendant's failure to 
testify. Lakeside, however, established that even the 
defendant has no constitutional interest in preventing the 
judge from giving a "no inference" instruction. Thus, Lakeside 
stands for the proposition that such instructions can do no 
constitutionally cognizable harm. If a criminal defendant has 
no constitutional interest in being tried without a "no 
jnference" instruction, I think it follows a fortiori that the 
5But see note 3 ~'l!_pr C!. 
9. 
state has no valid interest in protecting defendants from the 
perceived harm of that instruction.6 
Of course, the fact that the State has no particular 
interest in banning the "no inference" instruction does not 
mean that petr's conviction is constitutionally defective. 
Petr still must demonstrate some way in which the absence of 
the instruction infringes on some constitutional right. On the 
facts of this case, I tend to think he has made the necessary 
showing. 
To be sure, there is a difference between the Griffin 
situation (in which the judge instructed the jury that it could 
draw inferences from the defendant's failure to testify) and 
the situation here (in which the trial court said nothing). I 
am not sure that this difference is constitutionally 
significant. As Justice Stewart has pointed out, "the jury 
will, of course, realize" when the defendant has not testified, 
whether or not the prosecution or court comments adversely 
about it. Griffin, supra, at 621 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 




significant that the State does not assert that 
an interest in trying to keep jury instructions 
expect the defendant to offer evidence to contradict that of 
the State. When the defendant does not do so, again unless 
instructed to the contrary, the jury probably will construe his 
omission as relevant to guilt. 
In Griff in, the Court recognized that a defendant's 
Fifth Amendment right necessarily requires that the defendant 
not be penalized when he exercises that right. According to 
the Court, a defendant is penalized if jurors attach 
significance to his failure to testify. Human nature being 
what it is, I think jurors will attach significance to the 
defendant's failure to testify unless instructed to the 
contrary. As Justice Stewart noted in Griffin, it cannot be 
said that "the inferences drawn by a jury will be more 
detrimental to a defendant [when the judge or prosecution 
comments unfavorably on his failure to testify] than would 
result if the jury were left to roam at large with only its 
untutored instincts to guide it, to draw from the defendant's 
silence broad inferences of guilt." 380 U.S. at 621 (Stewart, 
J., dissenting) • 
Summary 
Griff in prohibited judges and prosecutors from 
commenting on the defendant's failure to testify. The case so 
held because the defendant is penalized in the exercise of his 
Fifth Amendment rights if the jury attaches significance to the 
defendant's failure to explain himself. Jurors are prone to 
construe a defendant's silence as evidence of guilt unless 
properly instructed. 
jurors burdens the 
Id. That 
defendant's 
inclination on the part of 
Fifth Amendment right by 
exacting a cost for its exercise. To combat the natural, but 
improper impulses of jurors, I believe the state trial judge in 
this case should have instructed them not to attach 
significance to the defendant's failure to testify. On the 
facts of this case, see ante at 4-5, the defendant appears to 
have a substantial interest in that instruction; the State 
does not even claim that it would suffer any burden from having 
to give it. 
P.w.c. 1/13/81 
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Under the compulsion of previous 
decisions that are unlikely to be dis-
turbed, I join your opinion. 
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Mr. Justice Stewart 
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80-5060 Carter v. Commonwealth of Kentucky. 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
In joining the opinion of the Court, as I do, I 
write briefly to make clear that for me this is required by 
precedent, not by what I think the Constittuion either 
requires or should require. 
No. 80-5060, Carter v. Kentucky 
5 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although joining the opinion of the Court, I 
write briefly to make clear that, for me, this result is 
required by precedent, not by what I think the 
Constitution should require. 10 
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth, provides that no person "shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." The question in Griffin v. California, 380 u.s. 
609 (1965), was whether this proscription was violated if 15 
jurors were told that they could draw inferences from a 
defendant's failure to testify. The Court held that 
neither the judge nor the prosecutor could suggest that 
jurors draw such inferences. ~t j s-....ax.-iomat ic, of course, 
J. ~~~ct'..~ 
~f.M defendant who chooses not to testify GanRet be sa~ 20 
1\ 
~~~ 
t.o. haw;_ been compelled to testify. The Court held, ,., 
lfp/ss 2/16/81 Rider A, p. 2 (Carter) 
It 1is often~overlooked that the purpose of a criminal 
) i t 
trial, conducted according to law, is to convict ~ guilttr 
i fl, J 0 
'd-e,fendant.. Our - Rul:es of Procedure and Evidence are designed to 
facilitate the ascertainment of the truth. The one person who 
usually knows the most about the critical facts is the accused. 
For reasons deeply rooted in the history we share with England, 
'0 
the Bill of Rights included the self incrimination clause that 
enables a defendant in a criminal trial to elect to make no 
contribution to the fact- f rrling process. ,f--c;ar.r~erc:e-.±:ve.':~£- no 
. ~ A A 
/ \:- --~ /)-..,.{ . 
rAa~ ~hy juror~ -who ~en instructed that the defendant 
J-.1..-r 
is presumed to be innocent and this presumption can be 
~ . 
~ \::.: .) 6 
overridden~by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt\ J'. ~ should Ret-
- ' -- ~ .-1 !1'1/l~ f .~, .. 0'1;:·-.. "' ~~, ~ . . 
beA~~ to draw unfavorable inferences when a defendant elects 
to remain silent. 






any imposed by courts for 
L.l~J 
ilege" cannot be tolerated exercising ~ constitutional 
r;:,~ .u.,.., ~~ 
" [ i] t cuts down on the pr i · lege11 by making its .,le.~j because 
assertion costly." Id., at 614. 
·~ 
JUSTICE STEWARTAdissent~ in He wrote: 
We must determine whether the petitioner has 
been "compelled • . to be a witness against 
himself." Compulsion is the focus of the 
inqul.ry. Certainly, if any compulsion be 
detected in the ~alifornia procedure, it is of a 
dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which 
historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment 
g ua ran tee • rwwn~raa:-mim>m;t-~ra"!!t--Bi~~R,.t;,__;ee~rre1 
e ourt of High Commission or Star 
Chamber, he was commanded to answer whatever was 
asked of him, and subjected to a far-reaching 
and deeply probing inquiry in an effort to 
ferret out some unknown and frequently 
unsuspected crime. He declined to answer on 
pain of incarceration, banishment, or 
mutilation. And if he spoke falsely, he was 
subject to further punishment. Faced with this 
formidable array of alternatives, his decision --z:J' 
to speak was unquestionably coerced. 
Those were the lurid realities which lay 
behind enactment of the Fifth Amendment, a far 
cry from the subject matte of the ase befor 
'-"""_.,,_. "' I f 1n t: at e Court in this c e 
stretches the concept of compulsion beyond all 
reasonable bounds, and that whatever compulsion 
may exist derives from the defendant's choice 





620-621 (STEWART, J., 
Y.J.-r---t'""Tf.e n 
Id. , 
dissentin.U.~*" 1 :fq 
at 
JSk~, ?) 
well served--nor, as the dissent in Griffin pointed out, 









'ncrimination furthered--when the jury is told not to draw 65 
3 0 
ences from the defendant 1 s failure to 
that cry out for explanation. As former 
California Chief Justice Traynor commented, judges and 
prosecutors should be able to explain that "a jury [may] 
draw unfavorable inferences from the defendant 1 s failure 70 
to explain or refute evidence when he could reasonably be 
expected to do so. Such comment would not be evidence and 
would do no more than make clear to the jury the extent of 
its freedom in drawing inferences." Traynor, The Devils 
of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and 75 
Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 677 (1966); accord, 
Schaefer, Police Interrogation and the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. u. L. Rev. 506, 520 (1966). 
$ ~~ 
I therefore would have joined JUSTICE STEWART in 
~ 
~ 
dissent in Griffin. But Griffin is the law, and based on 80 
" 
that case the present petitioner was entitled to the jury 
instruction that he requested. I therefore join the 
opinion of the Court. 
;. 
No. 80-5060, Carter v. Kentucky 
JUSTICE POWELL, concurring. 
Although joining the opinion of the Court, I 5 
write briefly to make clear that, for me, this result is 
required by precedent, not by what I think the 
Constitution should require. 
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States 
through the Fourteenth, provides that no person "shall be 10 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." The question in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 
609 (1965), was whether this proscription was violated if 
jurors were told that they could draw inferences from a 
defendant's failure to testify. The Court held that 15 
neither the judge nor the prosecutor could suggest that 
jurors draw such inferences. A defendant who chooses not 
to testify hardly can claim that he was compelled to 
testify. The Court held, nevertheless, that any "penalty 
imposed by courts for exercising [this] constitutional 20 
privilege" cannot be tolerated because "[i]t cuts down on 
2. 
the privilege by making its assertion costly." Id., at 
614. 
JUSTICE STEWART's dissenting opinion in Griffin, 
in which JUSTICE WHITE joined, responded persuasively to 25 
this departure from the language and purpose of the self-
incrimination clause. JUSTICE STEWART wrote: 
We must determine whether the petitioner has 
been "compelled • to be a witness against 
himself." Compulsion is the focus of the 
inquiry. Certainly, if any compulsion be 
detected in the California procedure, it is of a 
dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which 
historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee ..•. 
* * * 
I think that the Court in this case stretches 
the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable 
bounds, and that whatever compulsion may exist 
derives from the defendant's choice not to 
testify, not from any comment by court or 
counsel. [T]he jury will, of course, 
realize th[e] quite evident fact [that the 
defendant has chosen not to testify] , even 
though the choice goes unmentioned. Id., at 
620-621 (STEWART, J., dissenting). --





who usually knows most about the critical facts is the 50 
accused. For reasons deeply rooted in the history we 
share with England, the Bill of Rights included the self-
incrimination clause that enables a defendant in a 
criminal trial to elect to make no contribution to the 
fact-finding process. But nothing in the clause requires 55 
that jurors--who have been instructed that the defendant 
2. 
the privilege by making its assertion costly." Id., at 
614. 
JUSTICE STEWART's dissenting opinion in Griffin, 
in which JUSTICE WHITE joined, responded persuasively to 25 
this departure from the language and purpose of the self-
incrimination clause. JUSTICE STEWART wrote: 
We must determine whether the petitioner has 
been "compelled . . to be a witness against 
himself." Compulsion is the focus of the 
inquiry. Certainly, if any compulsion be 
detected in the California procedure, it is of a 
dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which 
historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee. . . . 
* * * 
I think that the Court in this case stretches 
the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable 
bounds, and that whatever compulsion may exist 
derives from the defendant's choice not to 
testify, not from any comment by court or 
counsel. [T)he jury will, of course, 
realize th[e) quite evident fact [that the 
defendant has chosen not to testify] , even 
though the choice goes unmentioned. Id., at 
620-621 (STEWART, J., dissenting). --





who usually knows most about the critical facts is the 50 
accused. For reasons deeply rooted in the history we 
share with England, the Bill of Rights included the self-
incrimination clause that enables a defendant in a 
criminal trial to elect to make no contribution to the 
fact-finding process. But nothing in the clause requires 55 
that jurors--who have been instructed that the defendant 
3 0 
is presumed to be innocent and that this presumption can 
be overridden only by evidence beyond a ' reasonable doubt--
should be told not to draw logical inferences when a 
defendant chooses not to explain incriminating 60 
circumstances. As former California Chief Justice Traynor 
commented, judges and prosecutors should be able to 
explain that "a jury [may] draw unfavorable inferences 
from the defendant's failure to explain or refute evidence 
when he could reasonably be expected to do so. Such 65 
comment would not be evidence and would do no more than 
make clear to the jury the extent of its freedom in 
drawing inferences." Traynor, The Devils of Due Process 
in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 657, 677 (1966): accord, Schaefer, Police 70 
Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 61 Nw. u. L. Rev. 506, 520 (1966). 
I therefore would have joined JUSTICES STEWART 
and WHITE in dissent in Griffin. But Griffin is now the 
law, and based on that case the present petitioner was 75 
entitled to the jury instruction that he requested. I 
therefore join the opinion of the Court. 
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Although joining the opinion of the Court, I 
write briefly to make clear that, for me, this result is 
required by precedent, not by what I think the 
Constitution should require. 
The Fifth Amendment, appl{cable to the States 
through the Fourteenth, provides that no person "shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." The question in Griffin v. California, 380 u.s. 
609 (1965), was whether this proscription was violated if 
jurors were told that they could draw inferences from a 
defendant's failure to testify. The Court held that 
neither the judge nor the prosecutor could suggest that 
jurors draw such inferences. A defendant who chooses not 
to testify hardly can claim 
~
that he was compelled to 
testify. The Court.l\held, nevertheless, that any "penalty 
imposed by courts for exercising [this] constitutional 
privilege" cannot be tolerated because "[i]t cuts down on 
the privilege by making its assertion costly." !d., at 
614. 
- 2 .• 
JUSTICE STEWART's dissenting opinion in Griffin, 
in which JUSTICE WHITE joined, responded persuasively to 
this departure from the language and purpose of the self-
incrimination clause. JUSTICE STEWART wrote: 
It ~e ~t determine whether the petitioner has 
been /' compelled . . • to be a witness against 
himself. 'b. Compulsion is the focus of the 
inquiry. Certainly, if any compulsion be 
detected in the California procedure, it is of a 
dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which 
historically gave rise to the Fifth Amendment 
guarantee. • 
• * * * I 
~ think that the Court in this case stretches 
the concept of compulsion beyond all reasonable 
bounds, and that whatever compulsion may exist 
derives from the defendant's choice not to 
testify, not from any comment by court - or __ _ 
counsel. [T]he jury will, of course, 
realize th[e] quite evident fact [that the 
defendant has chosen not to testify], even 
though the choice goes unmentioned. ~ Id. , at 
620-621 {STEWART, J., dissenting). --
The one person who usually knows most about the 
critical facts is the accused. For reasons deeply rooted 
in the history we share with England, the Bill of Rights 
included the self-incrimination clause that enables a 
defendant in a criminal trial to elect to make no 
contribution to the fact-finding process. But nothing in 
the clause requires that jurors--who have been instructed 
that the defendant is presumed to be innocent and that 
---- ----- ---------------------·---- -~-~ 
3. 
this presumption can be overridden only by evidence beyond 
a reasonable doubt--should be told not to draw logical 
inferences when a defendant chooses not to explain 
incriminating circumstances. As former California Chief 
Just ice Traynor commented, judges and prosecutors should 
be able to explain that "a jury [may] draw unfavorable 
inferences from the defendant's failure to explain or 
refute evidence when he could reasonably be expected to do 
l so. Such comment would not be evidence and would do no 
more than make clear to the jury the extent of its freedom 
in drawing inferences." Traynor, The Devils of Due 
Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 u. 
Chi. L. Rev. 657, 677 (1966); accord, Schaefer, Police~ 
Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self: 
Incrimination, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 506, 520 (1966). 
I therefore would have joined JUSTICES STEWART 
and WHITE in dissent in Griffin. But Griffin is now the 
law, and based on that case the present petitioner was 
entitled to the jury instruction that he requested. I 
therefore join the opinion of the Court. 
- ---- ---=~--=-
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Ju sTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although joining the opinion of the Court, I write briefly 
to make clear that, for me, this result is required by prece-
dent, not by what I think the Constitution should require. 
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the 
Foureenth , provides that no person 11shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The 
question in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 ( 1965), was 
whether this proscription was violated if jurors were told 
that they could draw inferences from a defendant's failure 
to testify. The Court held that neither the judge nor the 
prosecutor could suggest that jurors draw such inferences. 
A defendant who chooses not to testify hardly can claim 
that he was compelled to testify. The Court also held , 
nevertheless. that any "penalty imposed by courts for exer-
cising [this] constitutional privilege" cannot be tolerated 
because "[i] t cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly." /d., at 614. 
J usTICE STEWART's dissenting opinion in Griffin, in which 
JusTICE WHITE joined, responded persuasively to this de-
parture from the language and purpose of the self-incrim-
ination clause. JusTICE S'rEWAR'l' wrote: 
"We must determine whether the petitioner has been 
'compelled . . . to be a witness against himself. ' Com-
pulsion is the focus of the inquiry. Certainly, if any 
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is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which historically 
gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee .... 
"I think that the Court in this case stretches the con-
cept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and 
that whatever compulsion may exist derives from the 
defendant's choice not to testify. not from any comment 
by court or counsel. . . . rTJhe jury will. of course, 
realize th[el quite evident fact [that the defendant has 
chosen not to testify]. even though the choice goes un-
mentioned." !d., at 620-621 (STEW~RT. J .. ciissenting). 
The one person who usually knows most about the critical 
facts is the accused. For reasons deeply rooted in the his-
tory we share with England, the Bill of Rights included the 
self-incrimination clause that enables a defendant in a crim-
inal trial to elect to make no contribution to the fact-finding 
process. But nothing in the clause requires that jurors-
who have been instructed that the defendant is presumed 
to be innocent and that this presumption can be overridden 
only by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt---should be told 
not to draw logical inferences when a defendant chooses not 
to explain incriminating circumstances. As former Califor-
nia Chief Justice Traynor commented. judges and prosecu-
ton: should bo able to explain that "a jury [may l draw 
unfavorable inferences from the defendant's failure to ex-
plain or refute evidence when he could reasonably be ex-
pected to do so. Such comment would not be evidence and 
would do no more than make clear to the jury the extent of 
its freedom in drawing inferences." Traynor. The Devils of 
Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 677 (1966); accord, Schaefer, Police 
Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Iucrimiuatiqn, 
61 · Nw. U. L. Rev. 506, 520 (1966). 
80-5060-CONCUH (A) 
CARTER v. KENTUCKY 
I therefore would have joined JusTICES STEWART and 
WHITE in dissent in Griffin. But Griffin is now the law, and 
based on that case the present petitioner was entitled to the 
jury instruction that he requested. I therefore join the: 
opinion of the Court .. 
2-27-81 
1st PRINTED DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 80-5060 
Lonnie Joe Carter, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari ,to the 
v. Supreme Court of Ken-
Commonwealth of Kentucky. tucky. 
[March -, 1981] 
JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although joining the opinion of the Court, I write briefly 
to make clear that, for me, this result is required by prece-
dent, not by what I think the Constitution should require. 
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the 
Foureenth, provides that no person "shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The 
question in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), was 
whether this proscription was violated if jurors were told 
that they could draw inferences from a defendant's failure 
to testify. The Court held that neither the judge nor the 
prosecutor could suggest that jurors draw such inferences. 
A defendant who chooses not to testify hardly can claim 
that he was compelled to testify. The Court also held, 
nevertheless, that any "penalty imposed by courts for exer-
cising [this] constitutional privilege" cannot be tolerated 
because "[i]t cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly." !d., at 614. 
JusTICE STEWAR'l''s dissenting opinion in Griffin, in which 
JusTICE WHITE joined, responded persuasively to this de-
parture from the language and purpose of the self-incrim-
ination clause. JusTICE STEWART wrote: 
"We must determine whether the petitioner has been 
'compelled ... to be a witness against himself.' Com-
pulsion is the focus of the inquiry. Certainly, if any 
compulsion he detected in the California procedure, it 
z 
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is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which historically 
gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee .... 
"I think that the Court in this case stretches the con-
cept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and 
that whatever compulsion may exist derives from the 
defendant's choice not to testify. not from any comment 
by court or counsel. . . . [T]he jury will. of course, 
realize th[el quite evident fact [that the defendant has 
chosen not to testify], even though the choice goes un-
mentioned." Id., at 620-621 (STEWART, J .. dissenting). 
The one person who usually knows most about the critical 
facts is the accused. For reasons deeply rooted in the his-
tory we share with England. the Bill of Rights included the 
!Self-incrimination clause that enables a defendant in a crim-
inal trial to elect to make no contribution to the fact-fillding 
process. But nothing in the clause requires that jurors-
who have been instructed that the defendant is presumed 
to be innocent and that this presumption can be overridden 
only by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt-should be told 
not to draw logical inferences when a defendant chooses not 
to explain incriminating circumstances. As former Califor-
nia Chief Justice Traynor commented. judges and prosecu-
torr. should be able to explain that "a jury [mayl draw 
unfavorable inferences from the defendant's failure to ex-
plain or refute evidence when he could reasonably be ex-
pected to do so. Such comment would not be evidence and 
would do no more than make clear to the jury the extent of 
its freedom in drawing inferences." Traynor. The Devils of 
Due Process in Criminal Detection. Detention, and Trial. 33 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 657. 677 (1966); accord, Schaefer. Police 
Interrogation and the Privilege Against Self-Incriminatiqn, 
fH Nw. U. L. Rev. 506, 520 (1966). 
80-5060-CONCUR (A) 
CARTER v. KENTUCKY 
I therefore would have joined JusTICES STEWART and 
WHITE in dissent in Griffin. But Griffin is now the law, and 
hased on that case the present petitioner was entitled to the 
jury instruction that he requested. I therefore join the: 
·opinion of the Court .. 
;3-6-81 
.SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STAT~ 
No. 80-5060 
J-onnie Joe Carter, Petitioner, On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. 
Commonwealth of Kentucky. 
Supreme Court of Ken-
tucky. 
[March 9, 1981] 
JusTICE PowELL, concurring. 
Although joining the opinion of the Court, I write briefly 
to make clear that, for me, this result is required by prece-
dent, not by what I think the Constitution should require. 
The Fifth Amendment, applicable to the States through the 
Fourteenth, provides that no person "shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The 
question in Griffin v. California, 380 U. S. 609 (1965), was 
whether this proscription was violated if jurors were told 
that they could draw inferences from a defendant's failure 
to testify. The Court held that neither the judge nor the 
prosecutor could suggest that jurors draw such inferences. 
A defendant who chooses not to testify hardly can claim 
that he was compelled to testify. The Court also held, 
nevertheless, that any "penalty imposed by courts for exer-
cising [this] constitutional privilege" cannot be tolerated 
because "[i]t cuts down on the privilege by making its asser-
tion costly." Id., at 614. 
JusTICE STEWART's dissenting opinion in Griffin, in which 
JusTICE WHITE joined, responded persuasively to this de-
parture from the language and purpose of the self-incrim-
ination clause. JUSTICE STEW ART wrote: 
''We must determine whether the petitioner has been 
'compelled ... to be a witness against himself.' Com-
pulsion is the focus of the inquiry. Certainly, if any 
compulsion be detected in the California procedure, it 
2 
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is of a dramatically different and less palpable nature 
than that involved in the procedures which historically 
gave rise to the Fifth Amendment guarantee .... 
"I think that the Court in this case stretches the con-
cept of compulsion beyond all reasonable bounds, and 
that whatever compulsion may exist derives from the 
defendant's choice not to testify, not from any comment 
by court or counsel. . . . [T]he jury will, of course, 
realize th[e] quite evident fact [that the defendant has 
chosen not to testify], even though the choice goes un-
mentioned." Id., at 620- 621 (STEWART, J. , dissenting). 
The one person who usually knows most about the critical 
facts is the accused. For reasons deeply rooted in the his-
tory we share with England, the Bill of Rights included the 
self-incrimination Clause, which enables a defendant in a 
criminal trial to elect to make no contribution to the fact-
finding process. But nothing in the Clause requires that 
jurors not draw logical inferences when a defendant chooses 
not to explain incriminating circumstances. Jurors have 
been instructed that the defendant is presumed to be inno-
cent and that this presumption can be overridden only by 
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. California Chief Jus-
tice Traynor commented that judges and prosecutors should 
be able to explain that "a jury [mayl draw unfavorable in-
ferences from the defendant's failure to explain or refute evi-
dence when he could reasonably be expected to do so. Such 
comment would not be evidence and would do no more than 
make clear to the jury the extent of its freedom in drawing 
inferences." Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Crim-
inal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. Chi. L. Rev. 657, 
677 (196.6); accord, Schaefer, Police Interrog,ation and the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw. U. L. Rev. 506, 
520 (1966) , 
r '"' 
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I therefore would have joined JusTICES STEWART and 
WHITE in dissent in Griffin. But Griffin is now the law, and 
based on that case the present petitioner was entitled to the 
jury instruction that he requested. I therefore join the 
opinion of the Court. 
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Time for Actl"On 
r~ nation may be on the verge of 
experiencing a badly needed and too-
long-delayed all-out war on violent 
crime. 
Last Sunday's dramatic call from 
Chief Justice Warren Burger for 
strong anti-crime measures has 
drawn favorable comment, even 
from some sources that normally 
differ sharply with the chief justice 
on judicial philosophy. 
Then on Wednesday came the 
welcomed report that Justice 
Department officials, in the new 
Reagan administration, are 
developing proposals to beef up the 
federal government's ability to fight 
violent crime. One purpose, as a 
news story put it, Is to counter-
balance what administration of-
ficials see as "the courts' 
longstanding emphasis on the legal 
rights of defendants." 
Under consideration are pro-
posals to make murder-for-hire a 
federal offense, to permit judges to 
keep potentially dangerous accused 
persons in custody pending trial in-
stead of requiring release if ball Is 
provided, to establish a victim com-
pensation fund, to provide new 
protections for crime victims and 
witnesses, and to make a prison sen-
tence mandatory for any person 
committing a crime in which a 
weapon is used or someone Is in-
jured. 
"We have established a system of 
criminal justice that provides more 
protection, more safeguards, more 
guarantees for those accused of 
crime than any other nation In all 
history," Chief Justice Burger 
declared in his speech to the 
American Bar Association. So many 
safeguards, he suggested, that there 
now may be "a dangerous imbal-
ance" in favor of the accused. 
One reason for the imbalance is 
found in such court decisions as that 
in Griffin vs. California, a case 
decided on a 6-to-2 vote of the 
Supreme Court in 1965. 
An issue in that case was whether a 
prosecutor could comment on the 
failure of a defendant to take the wit-
ness stand in his own trial. The court 
held that the defendant's Fifth 
Amendment right against self-
incrimination would be violated by 
such comment. 
It is reaching far into left field to 
read any such prohibition into the 
amendment's statement that "no 
person ... shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against 
himself." The protection is against 
the defendant being forced to 
testify; calling attention to the fact 
that a defendant has availed himself 
of that protection is not forcing him 
to testify. 
Former C]lief Juatlce Walter ,V. 
S~efi:& of the IIIinois Supreme 
Court put the matter in perspective 
when he wrote: 
"It is entirely unsound to exclude 
from consideration at the trial the 
silence of a suspect Involved In cir-
cumstances reasonably calling for 
explanation, or of a defendant who 
does not take the stand. It therefore 
seems to me Imperative that the 
privilege against self-incrimination 
be modified to permit comment 
upon such silence." 
Justices Potter Stewart and Byron 
White, who were on the court in 1965 
and are on the court today, dissented 
on the Fifth Amendment decision, 
declaring that'' the court In this case 
stretches the concept of compulsion 
beyond all reasonable bounds .... '' 
They said if a prosecutor called at-
tention to a defendant's failure to 
take the stand, the defendant's 
lawyer would have the opportunity 
to offer reasons for that failure, if he 
wished to do so. We suspect that 
several of the colleagues of Justices 
Stewart and White on the present 
court - a markedly different court 
from that of 1965- would agree with 
the dissenters in the 1965 case, but 
the court is so reluctant to overturn 
previous decisions that it probably 
would not change the ruling if an op-
portunity to do so arose. 
Meanwhile, evidence that the 
public is fed up with violent crime 
and is demanding action is pointed 
out in Richard Reeves' column on 
the opposite page today. He cites a 
Los Angeles newspaper poll reveal-
ing that 77 percent of those persons 
questioned believe the courts do not 
deal harshly enough with criminals. 
Says Reeves: "People, at least the 
ones I've talked with, are scared and 
angry - much more so than I can 
ever remember." 
If the people get angry enough, the 
administrative, legislative and 
judicial branches of government at 
all levels will respond with forceful 
action against crime. It is a response 
that is long overdue. 
Public opinion is stron-
ger than the Legislature, 
and nearly as strong as 
the Ten Commandments. 
CHARLES DUDLEY 
WARNER 
tN1 Or Ct'ucago Tubunt NY Ntwl $ynd Inc 




~ ~- (_ "3P- 17SO 
' . 
